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ABSTRACT
Thispaper reviews some recent empirical analyses of the impact of
affirmative action and anti-discrimination law on employment and productivity.
The major findings are that:
1)Affirmative action has some success in improving employment
opportunities for minorities and females, particularly for blacks.
Results for white females are mixed.
2)Increases in black employment under affirmative action have taken
placein both high—skilled and low—skilled occupations.
3) Compliance reviews have not been targeted against establishments
with the lowest relative proportions of minority or female
employment. Targetting seems more compatible with an earnings
redistribution rather than an anti—discrimination program.
4) While many of the detailed enforcement steps and sanctions of the
contractcompliance process seem to have little effect individually,
the compliance review process as a whole has been effective.
5) Thesystem of goals and timetables have not been adhered to as
rigidlyas one might expect of quotas. The goals firms agree to are
greatly inflated relative to their subsequent achievements, but they
are not hollow promises.
6) Litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has
played a significant role in increasing black employment. In
addition, as minority and female employment shares have increased,







Berkeley,California 94720Affirmative action, mandated by Executive Order 11246 in 1965, is one of the
most controversial government interventions in the labor market since
abolition.In recent years, two major criticisms of affirmative action have
been given prominent voice. The first is that affirmative action does not work;
therefore, we should dispose of it. The second is that affirmative action does
work; therefore, we should dispose of it.My chief concern here will be with
the first of these criticisms.While much has been said concerning the pro-
priety of affirmative action in theory, little is known about the impact of
affirmative action in practice. If affirmative action has not changed the em-
ployment patterns of non—whites and females, then much of the discussion since
1965 of its philosophical merits amounts to shadow—boxing. The goal of affir-
mative action is to increase employment opportunities for females and rninori—
ties. Has affirmative action been successful in achieving this goal? In this
paper, affirmative action will refer to the provisions related to race, color
and sex of Executive Order 11246 as amended by Executive Order 11375 [3 C.F.R.
169 (1974)]. This is distinct from affirmative action required as a remedy by
judicial decision, which shall not be discussed here.
The purpose and development of affirmative action cannot be fully understood
outside of history, a history that includes most saliently the institution of
slavery in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the Civil Rights movement of the
mid 20th century.The genesis in discord and crisis of the first Executive
Order by President Roosevelt is most instructive.To protest employment dis-
crimination at the beginning of World War II, A. Philip Randolph, President of
the Sleeping Car Porters Union, threatened to disrupt the defense effort by a
mass demonstration of blacks in Washington, D.C. on July 1, 1941.Less thanone week before the planned rally, Executive Order 8802 was issued and the
demonstration called off.(Goldstein, 1981, p. 10)In the words of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, the Executive Order was prompted by the threat of
a Negro March on Washington, which would have revealed to the world a divided
country at a time when national unity was essential".(USCCR, 1961, p.10)
Accomodation was only reached under dire threat, and even then was of a limited
nature.
The distance this country has come in terms of the growing import of affir-
mative action, expanding intervention by the federal government, and changing
attitudes towards discrimination since 1941 can best be judged by considering
the words of Mark Ethridge, first Chairman of the Fair Employment Practice
Committee, established to supervise compliance with the executive order.In
the following quote, Ethridge sharply limits the scope of anti—discrimination
policy in a manner startling to modern eyes.
Although he defended the granting of civil rights and equal
opportunity to Negores, he also affirmed his personal sup-
port of segregation in the South.Stressing that 'the
committee has taken no position on the question of segre-
gation of industrial workers', he emphasized that 'Execu-
tive Order 8802 is a war order, and not a social document',
that it did not require the elimination of segregation, and
that had it done so, he would have considered it 'against
the general peace and welfare .. inthe Nazi dictatorial
pattern rather than in the slower, more painful ,but
sounder pattern of the democratic process.'(Ruchames, 1953,
p. 28)
Of course, the delicate question of how to swiftly remedy the harm done by
discrimination without distorting the democratic process is still with us, as
is the question of whether the democratic process can function well outside an
integrated society.Democratic society requires a consensus for change, but
it depends upon the full participation of its members.The last forty years
2have witnessed a slow and at times painful process of confrontation and accom-
modation, developing a consensus that provides the foundation for a lasting
change in attitudes towards discrimination.
Prior to Executive Order 10925, issued March 6, 1961 by President Kennedy,
the anti—discrimination program for federal contractors lacked any real teeth.
In a detailed study of the presidential Fair Employment Practice Committees,
Norgren and Hill (1964, p. 169, p. 171) state: "One can only conclude that the
twenty years of intermittent activity by presidential committees has had little
effect on traditional patterns of Negro employment.", and that "It is evident
that the non—discrimination clause in government contracts was virtually unen—
forced by the contracting agencies during the years preceeding 1961." Compli-
ance programs, such as Plans for Progress and its predecessors, were voluntary.
Their history strikes at least a cautionary note about the effectiveness of
programs that have no legal sanctions behind them.The 1961 Executive Order
was the first to go beyond anti—discrimination and to require contractors to
take affirmative action, and the first to establish specific sanctions including
termination of contract and debarment. Coming on the heels of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Executive Order 11246, which made the Secretary of
Labor rather than a presidential committee responsible for administering
enforcement, was the first to be enforced stringently enough to provoke serious
conflict and debate. On October 13, 1967, Executive Order 11375 amended 10246
to expand its coverage to women, although effective regulation against sex
discrimination did not reach full stride until after the Equal Employment Act
of 1972 was enacted.
The details of the affirmative action obligation began to be elaborated in
a twisting history. Detailed regulations, including numerical goals, were in—
3troduced in 1969, after the Comptroller General ruled that the affirmative
action obligation was too vague to fulfill the requirement that minimum contract
standards be made clear to prospective bidders.[48 Comp. Gen. 326 (1968)].
Numerical goals were first introduced in the manning tables embodied in the
Cleveland and Philadelphia plans for construction contractors (see Jones), and
later won the tacit approval of Congress and the courts.
Under Executive Order 11246, federal contractors agree "not to discriminate
against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin, and to take affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are employed and employees are treated during employment without
regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin."[3 C.F.R. 169
202(1)(1974)]. This language imposes two obligations: first, not to discrim-
inate; second, whether or not there is any evidence of discrimination, to take
affirmative action not to discriminate. It is a measure of this nation's
progress that the first obligation is now largely beyond debate. The redundant
sounding second obligation, however, is anything but. It has provoked continual
controversy, and its meaning and effect are not well understood. In the heated
political arguments over whether and what affirmative action should be, mythic
visions have come to overwhelm any clear conception of what affirmative action
actually is. To say that this second obligation as it has been developed in
the regulations, has provoked a good deal of debate would be a considerable
understatement.[See also Fiss (1971) and Glazer (1975)]In the words of one
legal expert:
The affirmative action obligations imposed by the Contract
Compliance Program are separate and distinct from non-
discrimination obligations and are not based on proof of
individual acts of discrimination. At the logical extreme,
affirmative action and non—discrimination obligations can
be viewed as mutually exclusive and inconsistent ...in
4practice, the non—discrimination and affirmative action
obligations may be incompatible when, for example, a less
qualified, less senior female or black is granted a job
preference that disadvantages a male or white solely on the
basis of sex or race to achieve an affirmative action
commitment.(Smith, p. 1028)
Reviewing the development of affirmative action into "quotas", Lawrence
Silberman, former Undersecretary of Labor from 1970 to 1973, wrote:
"In practice, employers anxious to avoid inquiry from gov-
ernment officials concerned only with results (rather than
merely with efforts) often earmarked jobs for minorities
without regard to qualifications. . ..Inhindsight, one
can see this was predictable. We wished to create a gen-
eralized, firm, but gentle pressure to balance the residue
of discrimination.Unfortunately, the pressure numerical
standards generate cannot be generalized or gentle; it in-
evitably causes injustice. ... Ouruse of numerical
standards in pursuit of equalopportunity hasled
ineluctably to the very quotas, guaranteeing equal results,
that we initially wished to avoid. ..- Tobe sure, we
were not solely responsible.Federal courts already had
begun to fashion orders in employment discrimination cases
which went beyond relief for those specifically discrimi-
nated against. The orders required employers found guilty
of discrimination to hire in accordance with a set ratio
of whites to blacks, whether or not new black applicants
had suffered discrimination. Thus was introduced a group
rights concept antithetical to traditional American notions
of individual merit and responsibility.It was on that
developing legal authority that the Philadelphia Plan was
defended when challenged. ...
Thisraises at least two issues.The first is that an affirmative action
program without measurable results invites sham efforts and may also fail to
meet the requirement of federal procurement law that prospective bidders be
informed of the minimum standards for a contract. On the other hand, numerical
standards in the quest for equal opportunity open the door to an emphasis on
equal results. The second issue raised is whether discrimination and its remedy
should be addressed in terms of groups or individuals.James E. Jones, Jr.,
former Associate Solicitor of Labor for Labor Relations and Civil Rights, and
San architect of the Revised Philadelphia Plan, takes (1977, P. 67) as his fun—
darnental premise that:
"the affirmative action obligation is a contractual under-
taking imposed by the Executive Orders without concern for
the guilt or innocence of the subject contractors and
without concern for individual entitlement to the fruits
of affirmative action efforts.Thus, an individual com-
plaint oriented process of enforcement completely misper-
ceives the function which should have been the major
emphasis of the administrative process."
In the past the affirmative action obligation has been criticized as being
vague and open—ended.In 1967, the Director of the OFCC, Edward Sylvester,
stated: "There is no fixed and firm definition of affirmative action.I would
say that in a general way, affirmative action is anything you have to do to get
results. ... Affirmativeaction is really designed to get employers to apply
the same kind of imagination and ingenuity that they apply to other phases of
their operation."(Report, 1967, p. 73—74)
To be vague concerning methods is the ideal decentralized approach, but this
is also vague about the critical issue of ends. What is the goal against which
results are judged:non—discrimination or increased minority and female em-
ployment? The distinct, practical question of whether the two can be distin-
guished in an operational sense is, of course, one of the important questions
that will concern us here.
Past Studies
The literature on affirmative action can be divided into studies of the
regulatory process that find it mortally flawed and studies of impact that find
6it successful.The process studies by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
(USCCR), the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the House and Senate Commit-
tees on Labor and Public Welfare all conclude that affirmative action has been
ineffective and blame weak enforcement and a reluctance to apply sanctions.
For example, in its 1975 appraisal of the contract compliance program, the GAO
found (p. 30) that The almost nonexistence of enforcement actions taken could
imply to contractors that the compliance agencies do not intend to enforce the
program." That this is not merely politics can be judged from the fact that
the Department of Labor has been sued with some measure of success more than
once for failure to enforce affirmative action properly.See, e.g., the case
of Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 R.2d 1319 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied 100 S. Ct. 3010 (1980). Debarment, the ultimate sanction,
has been used only 26 times; debarment of the first nonconstruction contractor
did not occur until 1974. The GAO and USCCR have found that other forms of
regulatory pressure, such as pre—award reviews, delay of contract award, and
withholding of progress payments, have not been forcefully and consistently
pursued.However, as evidenced by the increased incidence of debarment and
back—pay awards, enforcement did become more aggressive after 1973.
In the light of the unanimity of these process studies in finding the af-
firmative action regulatory mechanism seriously deficient, it is surprising
that the few econometric studies of the impact of affirmative action in its
first years (Burman 1973; Ashenfelter and Heckman 1976; Goldstein and Smith
1976; Heckman and Wolpin 1976), all based on a comparison of EEO—1 forms by
contractor status, have generally found significant evidence that it has been
effective for black males. These few studies of the initial years of affirma-
tive action (1966—73) are not directly comparable because of different spec-
ifications, samples, and periods. They do find, nevertheless, that despite weak
7enforcement in its early years, and despite the ineffectiveness of compliance
reviews, affirmative action has been effective in increasing black male em-
ployment share in the contractor sector, but generally ineffective for other
protected groups.(See Brown for a review) Of the four studies, Goldstein and
Smith (1976) find the weakest effects. Their results indicate a .0004 yearly
increase in black males' share of total employment and a decrease in the ratio
of black to white males among nonreviewed contractors between 1970 and 1972.
Heckman and Wolpin's (1976) results indicate an effect an order of magnitude
greater, a .007 annual increase in black male's share of total employment be-
tween 1972 and 1973 comparing contractors and noncontractors. For comparison,
Burrnan (1973) reports roughly a .003 annual increase in black males' share of
male employment in the late sixties, and Ashenfelter and Heckrnan's (1976) re-
sults indicate a .0086 yearly increase in the ratio of black to white males
between 1966 and 1970.These past studies are all based on data for a period
that largely predates the beginning of substantial enforcement of regulations
barring sex discrimination, the start of aggressive enforcement in the mid
seventies, and the major reorganization of the contract compliance agencies into
the OFCCP in 1978.
Despite weak enforcement in its early years, these studies generally conclude
that affirmative action under the contract compliance program did lead to sig-
nificant increases in black males' employment share in contractor firms. This
econometric finding of a positive result is all the more notable in light of
the consistently negative appraisal of the OFCCP's regulatory mechanism by
Congress, the courts, the GAO, and the USCCR.
8The Impact of Affirmative Action on Employment
Has affirmative action been effective in increasing the employment of mi-
norities and women? Affirmative action under the Executive Order applies only
to federal contractors. One method of judging the effect of affirmative action
is then to compare the growth of minority and female employment at federal
contractor establishments with their employment growths at similar establish-
ments that do not bear the affirmative action obligation. With the cooperation
of the U.S. Department of Labor, I performed such a comparison using EEO—1 data
on employment demographics reported by 68,690 establishments in 1974 and 1980.
This sample includes more than 16 million employees.The results summarized
here are reported at length in Leonard (1983) and (1984a).
Table 1 [reproduced from Leonard (1984a)] compares the mean employment share
of demographic groups in 1974 and 1980 across contractor and non—contractor
establishments. Between 1974 and 1980 black male and female, and white female
employment shares increased significantly faster in contractor establishments
than in non—contractor establishments. The other side of this coin is that
white males' employment share declined significantly more among contractors.
Employment shares have increased for non—black minorities, but the differences
across sectors in Table 1 are not always significant.
Affirmative action appears to have similar effects once other variables are
controlled for. In other work I have estimated the impact of affirmative action
after controlling for establishment size, growth region, industry, occupational
and corporate structure. These additional controls help assure that differences
between contractor and non—contractor establishments reflect the impact of af-
firmative action rather than other unobserved differences.
9Table 2 [reproduced from Leonard (1984a)] shows a consistent pattern across
demographic groups of effective affirmative action. Over a 6—year period the
employment of members of protected groups grew significantly faster in con-
tractor than in non—contractor establishments. The growth rate is 3.8% faster
for black males, 7.9% for other minority males, 2.8% for white females, and
12.3% for black females. A summary measure, white male employment, grew 1.2%
slower in the contractor sector. All of these effects are significant at the
99% confidence level or better, and the effects for blacks and for white males
are robust across a number of specifications.
The demand shift for black males relative to white males estimated here for
contractor status is similar to that previously estimated by Ashenfelter and
Heckman (1976) and by Heckman and Wolpin (1976). The growth rate of black male
employment over 6 years in the contractor sector is 3.8% greater than among
noncontractors.Taking the sixth root yeilds an annual growth rate that is
0.62% greater in the contractor sector. For white males, the annual growth rate
is 0.2% slower among contractors, so contract status appears to shift the demand
for black males relative to white males by 0.82% per year.For comparison,
using a different specification in a sample of integrated establishments for
the earlier period 1966—70, Ashenfelter and Heckman report an annual shift
corresponding to 0.86% per year.
Compliance reviews have played a significant role over and above that of
contractor status, advancing black males by 7.9%, other minority males by 15.2%,
and black females by 6.1% among reviewed establishments.Compliance reviews
have retarded the employment growth of whites.The effect is significantly
negative in the case of white females but small and insignificant in the case
of white males——whom one would have expected to bear the brunt of the adjust—
10rnent. The anomalous result for white females is sensitive to specification.
It is also difficult to reconcile with the positive impact of contractor status
on white females, but may be influenced by a review process that asks for more
than last year, rather than more than average, in a time of sharply increasing
female labor supply. For black and other minority males, the impact of under-
going a compliance review is roughly twice that of being a contractor. With
the exception of white females, compliance reviews have an additional positive
impact on protected group employment beyond the contractor effect.Direct
pressure does make a difference.
The estimate in equation (3) is that the growth rate of black males' em-
ployment increased 3.8% more in contractor establishments, not countlng the
direct effect of reviews:6.8% of all contractor establishments, accounting
for 17.4% of all contractor employment, were reviewed in subsequent years.In
these establishments the black male growth rate was an additional 7.9% faster
than in nonreviewed contractors, so 12% faster than noncontractors. The total
impact of affirmative action among contractors is then the weighted average of
the annual 0.62% shift among nonreviewed contractors and the 1.91% shift among
reviewed contractors, or 0.84% per year. The demand shifts for other minority
males, white females, and black females are 1.69%, 0.37%, and 2.13%, respec-
tively. The shift is largest for black females, although the ranking of these
effects is sensitive to specification.
Employment opportunities depend critically on growth. Table 2 also indicates
that minorities and females experienced significantly greater increases in
representation in establishments that were growing and so had many job openings.
The elasticity of white male employment growth with respect to total employment
growth is .976, significantly less than one.This indicates that members of
11protected groups dominate the net incoming flows in both contractor and non—
contractor establishments. The respective elasticities for black males, other
males, white females, and black females are 1.22, 1.09, 1.02, and 1.19, all
significantly greater than one.Particularly in the case of blacks, of whom
the quantity supplied has not greatly increased, this suggests the importance
of Title VII, which applies to all establishments in the sample, in expanding
employment opportunities. Establishments that are not part of multiplant cor-
porations have significantly lower growth rates of employment of members of
protected groups. Corporate size is probably of greater consequence than es-
tablishment size, with larger corporations showing greater increases in minor-
ity and female employment. Establishment size itself has insignificant effects
on white and black males, but other males and black females grow significantly
faster at larger establishments, while white females grow significantly slower.
It is also important to note that the tests here also control for the skill
requirements of each establishment. Establishments that are nonclerical
white—collar intensive exhibit faster employment growth for both male and female
blacks and significantly slower growth for white males.
The efficacy of affirmative action depends critically on employment growth.
The even—numbered equations in table 2 include interactions of contractor and
review status with establishment size and growth rate.In every case, being a
contractor or undergoing a compliance review have significantly greater effects
if the establishment is growing. The evidence with respect to interactions of
affirmative action with establishment size is mixed. To illustrate, equation
(4) indicated that while black male employment grows 5.6% faster at contractor
establishments than a noncontractor establishments with stable employment, it
grows 6.7% faster at the mean total employment growth rate of 5.1%, and 7.4%
faster if total employment grows by 15%. Affirmative action has been far more
12successful at establishments that are growing and have room to accommodate
federal pressure.
The tests presented here suggest that while generating tremendouspublic
criticism and resistance and while undergoing frequent regulatoryreorganiza-
tion, affirmative action has actually been successful in promoting the employ-
ment of minorities and females, though less so in the case of white females.
In the contractor sector over a six year period affirmative action has increased
the demand relative to white males for black males by 6.5%, for nonblack mi-
nority males by 11.9%, and for white females by 3.5%. Among females, it has
increased the demand for blacks relative to whites by 11.0%.For a program
lacking public consensus and vigorous enforcement, this is a surprisinglystrong
showing. While the gains of white females are smaller than those of blacks,
it is important to keep in mind that the employment of females and minorities
has been increasing in both sectors.Indeed, if the OFCCP pressured estab-
lishments to hire more females and minorities relative to their ownpast records
rather than to industry and region averages, the observed pattern is just what
we would expect to see during a period when female labor supply had beengrow-
ing. Females' share would increase at all establishments because of the supply
shift, and contractor establishments would be under little pressure to employ
more females than noncontractors. The relatively short history of affirmative
action for females may also help explain the differential impact of affirmative
action across protected groups.
This section has reviewed significant large—sample evidence with detailed
controls at the establishment level. Members of protectedgroups have enjoyed
improved employment opportunities at contractor establishments subject to af-
firmative action, and compliance reviews appear to have been an effective tool
13in changing employment patterns. The evidence here is that a process that has
been frequently criticized as largely an exercise in paper pushing has actually
been of material importance in prompting companies to increase their employment
of minorities and females.
Occupational Advance
One of the major affirmative action battlefields lies in the white—collar
and craft occupations. It is in these skilled positions that employers are most
sensitive to productivity differences and have complained the most about the
burden of goals for minority and female employment. It is also in this region
of relatively inelastic supply that the potential wage gains to members of
protected groups are the greatest.
All four past studies of the impact of affirmative action on occupational
advance have found that while affirmative action increases total black male
employment among federal contractors, it does not increase their employment
share in the skilled occupations.Burman (1973) found the employment impact
of affirmative action to be largest in clerical and operative occupations, and
negative, though insignificant, for managers between 1967 and 1970.He also
found that affirmative action had an insignificant impact on an index of occu-
pational status. Ashenfelter and Heckman (1976) extended these results, finding
that affirmative action led to increases in black males employment share, but
that this was largest and most significant among operatives between 1966 and
1970.At the tops of occupational ladders, black males' share was estimated
to fall relative to that of white males in the contractor sector, sometimes
significantly.Overall, Ashenfelter and Heckman found no significant impact
14of contractor status on the relative occupational position of black workers.
Goldstein and Smith (1976) found similar results between 1970 and 1972. Heckman
and Wolpin (1976) found that black male employment gains were concentrated in
blue—collar occupations between 1972 and 1973. They also found that contractors
utilized a greater proportion of white males, and fewer blacks and females than
did non—contractors in some white-collar occupations.
These studies suggest that contractors have been able to fulfill their ob-
ligations by hiring into relatively unskilled positions. Before 1974, affir-
mative action appears to have been more effective in increasing employment than
in promoting occupational advancement. Some might argue that such a result is
only to be expected given a short supply of skilled minorities or females. The
presumption behind affirmative action, however, is that trainable members of
protected groups will be considered for skilled employment. Even in the case
of a small fixed supply, in its initial years affirmative action should induce
a reshuffling of skilled blacks and women from non—contractor to contractor
firms, without any upgrading of individuals necessary.By the late 1970s af-
firmative action was no longer as ineffective as it may have been in its early
years in increasing minority employment in skilled occupations, according to
results summarized here from Leonard (1984b). This difference may reflect the
increasing supply of highly educated blacks, as well as a more aggressive
enforcement program, in particular the consolidation of enforcement activities
into the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) in 1978.
The full story of the impact of affirmative action requires an analysis of
employment data within disaggregated occupations. To test this Leonard (1984b)
regresses the change in employment share on contractor and review status, es-
tablishment size, corporate structure, industry, region, and growth of total
15employment for the given demographic group, in samples of establishments re-
porting employment in nine occupations and two trainee positions. The evidence
is most striking in the case of black males.In every occupation except la-
borers and white—collar trainees, black males' share of employment has increased
faster in contractor than in non—contractor establishments, and except for op-
eratives and professionals these differences are significant. This impact is
found in both the proportionate change in black males' share of total employ-
ment, and in the proportionate change in the ratio of black male to white male
share.
The marginal impact of a compliance review, conditional on contractor status,
is also tested. The relative importance of being a contractor and of being a
reviewed contractor is mixed across occupations, but in every case, except
blue—collar trainees and clerks, reviewed establishments have increased black
males' employment share more than non—reviewed contractors.
The total impact of the contract compliance program, the weighted sum of
contractor and review effects, shows some evidence of a twist in demand toward
more highly skilled black males. The contract compliance program has not re-
duced the demand for black males in low skilled occupations, except for labor-
ers. It has raised the demand for black males more in the highly skill
white—collar and craft jobs than in the blue—collar operative, laborer, and
service occupations. While this may help explain why highly skilled black males
have been better off than their less skilled brethren, it does not help explain
why low skilled black males should be having greater difficulty over the years
in finding and holding jobs.
16Affirmative action has also helped non—black minority males, although toa
lesser extent. There is evidence of a twist in demand toward Hispanic,Asian,
and American Indian males in white—collar occupations, particularly in sales
and clerical positions, and away from this group in operative and laborerpo-
sitions. Compliance reviews have had a strong and significant additionalimpact
in the professional, managerial, and craft occupations. The total impact of
the contract compliance program on non—black minority males is positive in the
white—collar, craft, and service occupations, and in training programs. Rela-
tive to white males, affirmative action has increased the occupational status
of non—black minority males by 2%.
The evidence within occupations suggests that the contract compliancepro-
gram has had a mixed, and often negative impact on white females. For techni-
cal, sales, clerical, craft, and trainee workers, contractor status is
associated with a significant decline in white females' employment share.
Compliance reviews have also often had a negative impact. While both contracts
and reviews produce a significant 1% increase in white females' occupational
status, this positive impact disappears when changes in white females' occupa-
tional status are compared to the relatively greater gains of white males.
In contrast to whites, black females in contractor establishments have in-
creased their employment share in all occupations except technical, craft, and
white—collar trainee. Compliance reviews have had a mixed effect across occu-
pations. The positive impact of the contract compliance program is even more
marked when the position of black females is compared with that of white fe-
males. Overall, black females' index of occupational status has increased 1%
relative to that of white females under affirmative action.
17The conclusion drawn from this detailed analysis of employment by occupation
is that with the exception of white females, affirmative action appears to have
contributed to the occupational advance of members of protected groups.In
particular, for non—white males affirative action has increased demand rela-
tively more in the more highly skilled occupations.In a useful and important
paper, Smith and Welch (1984) show that part of this occupational upgrading may
be overstated because of biased reporting on EEO—1 forms, in particular the
upward reclassification of minority or female intensive occupations. The
finding of occupational advance for non—white males in Leonard (1984b) is re-
inforced by evidence from CPS wage equations that affirmative action has nar-
rowed the difference in earnings between the races by raising the occupational
level of non—white males. These wage equations are reported at greater length
in other work (Leonard, 1984d).To the extent that contractors may have se-
lectively reclassified upwards black and female intensive detailed occupations
at a faster rate than did non—contractors, this study and its predecessors will
oversate the actual occupational advance due to affirmative action. Of course,
pure reclassification would cause black losses in the lower occupations, which
is generally not observed.
Affirmative action does not appear to have directly contributed to the eco-
nomic bifurcation of the black community. As Leonard (1984d) shows, minority
male wages increase relative to those of white males in cities and industries
with a high proportion of employment in federal contractor establishments sub-
ject to affirmative action, although the effect is not always significant.
Affirmative action appears to increase the demand for lowly educated minority
males as well as for the highly educated.
18If minorities and females do not share the skills and interests of white
males, then perhaps the best one can expect from an affirmative action program
is to increase their employment. But to the extent that minoritiesand females
share the qualifications and interests of white males, an effective affirmative
action program should improve their chances of sharing the same occupations too.
Just as no policy works in isolation, so none can be evaluated in isolation.
The major finding reviewed in this section is that affirmative action has in-
creased the demand for minorities in skilled jobs in the contractor sector.
The relative demand shift has been greater for skilled than unskilled workers.
The success of this program in skilled occupations after 1974, where none had
been observed before, is probably due in part to the increasing supply of
skilled minorities in many fields, as well as to the more aggressive use of
sanctions after the early 1970's. The weaker results for white females must
be considered in light of the massive increase in female labor supply that has
led to increased frmale employment throughout the economy, and which may have
obscured the contractor effect. We have also seen minorities and females en-
joying the greatest gains at growing establishments, both contractor and non—
contractor. The lesson drawn is that affirmative action programs work best when
they are vigorously enforced, when they work with other policies that augment
the skills of members of protected groups, and when they work with growing em-
ployers.
Goals or Quotas?
Have these employment advances been achieved through the use of rigid quotas?
The goals and timetables for the employment of minorities and females drawn from
19federal contractors under affirmative action stand accused of two mutually in-
consistent charges.The first is that "goal" is really just an expedient and
polite word for quota. Affirmative action has really imposed inflexible quotas
for minority and female employment. The second is that these goals are worth
less than the paper they are written on.Affirmative action is a game played
for paper stakes and has never been enforced stringently enough to produce
significant results.
Under Executive Order 11246, federal contractors are required to take af-
firmative action not to discriminate and to develop affirmative action plans
(AAPs), including goals and timetables, for good—faith efforts to correct de-
ficiencies in minority and female employment. The aim of this section, which
summarizes Leonard (1985b), is to measure good faith, to determine what affir-
mative action promises are worth. Is negotiation over affirmative action goals
an empty charade played with properly penciled forms, or does it in fact lead
to more jobs for minorities and females in the contractor sector? If the latter
is the case, are these goals so strictly adhered to as to constitute quotas?
Since the reviews examined here have already been shown to be useful (Leonard
(1984a)), the question here is not "Are reviews effective?" but rather "Do
promises extracted during the review process contribute to the impact of re-
views?"
It is not beyond reason to suppose that they do not. Neither the penalties
for inflating promises to hasten the departure of federal inspectors nor the
prospects of being apprehended seems great. The ultimate saction available to
the government in the case of affirmative action is debarment, in which a firm
is barred from holding federal contracts.The first debarment of a non—
construction cntractor did not take place until 1974, and in total only 26 firms
20have ever been debarred. If the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP)
finds the establishment's affirmative action plan unacceptable, itmay issue a
show—cause notice as a preliminary step to high sanctions. This step has been
taken in only 1 to 4 percent of all reviews (USCCR, 1975,p. 297). Of these,
one—third to one—half involve basic and blatant paperwork deficiencies such as
the failure to prepare or update an AAP (US GAO, 1975, p. 26).
The other major sanction used by the OFCCP is back pay awarded as part of a
conciliation agreement.In 1973 and 1974, $54 million was awarded in 91
settlements, averaging $63 per beneficiary (US GAO, 1975, p. 46).In 1980, i.n
an even more skewed distribution, 9.2 million was awarded to 4336 employees
in 743 conciliation agreements (USCCR, 1982, p. 47). These beneficiaries re-
presented less than two—thirds of 1 percent of all protected—group employees
at just the reviewed establishments. While these affirmative action sanctions
have not been heavily employed, in many cases regulatory sanctions, likeweapons
of war, are judged most successful just when they are used the least. That does
not seem to be the case here.The U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the General
Accounting Office, committees of both Houses of Congress, and the courts have
all concurred in the judgment that the contract compliance agencies have not
made full and effective use of the sanctions at their disposal.
The low penalties if caught are compounded by the low probability of appre-
hension, although the Department of Defense (DOD), upon whose review this sec-
tion concentrates, had one of the most vigorous programs.In 1976, DOD is
reported to have reviewed 24 percent of its identified contractors, compared
to an average for all compliance agencies of 11 percent [USCCR, 1977, p. 113].
In 1977, 000 had a ratio of 42 contractor facilities per staff member, and a
total budget of $345 per contractor [USCCR, 1977, p. 107].It is striking to
21note that compliance reviews have not typically been targeted directly against
the most blatant form of employment discrimination. An establishment's history
of employment demographics has typically not played a role in the incidence of
compliance reviews, for a reason as procedurally obvious as it is logically
obscure:compliance officers have not generally looked at an establishment's
past AAPs or EEO—1 forms in targeting reviews. Heckman and Wolpin (1976) report
that reviews are essentially random with respect to the level or growth rates
of an establishment's demographics.Leonard (1985a) finds evidence that es-
tablishments with more blacks and females are actually more likely to be sub-
sequently reviewed. These two empirical studies agree that affirmative action
compliance reviews have not been targeted with greater frequency at establish-
ments with relatively few minorities or females.
In this light, the expected penalties for making promises to the government
with little regard for the likelihood of fulfilling those promises do not seem
overwhelming.In such circumstances, affirmative action promises may contain
little, if any, information about the establishment's future employment.On
the other hand, the OFCCP may use more subtle and less easily observed pres-
sures. Firms may care about their reputations, not only with the OFCCP but also
with their own employees and the public, and so strive to set reasonable goals.
More importantly, firms may react to the threat of Title VII litigation, with
its substantial legal costs and penalties, hanging over their heads while under
affirmative action review.
The employment goals that firms agree to under affirmative action are not
vacuous; neither are they adhered to as strictly as quotas. While affirmative
action promises are inflated, they are not hollow. For a sample of establish-
ments that experienced more than one compliance review during the 1970s, Leonard
22(1985b) compares the goals with the employment actually achieved one year later,
as in Table 3. The mode year for which projections are made is 1976.For an
observation in the mode year then, this table shows actual employment in 1974
and 1975, a projection of employment for 1976 made in 1975, and actual subse-
quent employment in 1976. The first finding in Table 1 is that establishments
on average overestimate the growth of total employment. They project 1 percent
employment growth one year ahead, but employment subsequently falls by 3 per-
cent.
The major finding in Table 3 is that neither absolute minority nor female
employment increased, but that both minority and female employment shares did
increase. This is because the contraction in employment that didoccur was
almostlily—white and predominantly male. Most of the average employment de-
cline of 27 was accounted for by white males, whose employment fell by 21. Put
another way, while white males averaged 57—63 percent of initial employment,
they accounted for 78 percent of the employment decline.Since females and
minorities typically have lower seniority, they are usually found to suffer
disproportionately more during a downturn.In this perspective, the finding
here that white males accounted for most of the employment decline is itself
striking evidence of the impact of affirmative action.
These establishments are projecting swift and substantial increases in black
male employment.If the one—year projections in Table 3 are extrapolated for
ten years, then fully 14 percent of the workforce at these plants would be black
males.
These projections and actualizations can also be expressed as shares of total
employment. Over time, minority and female employment shares are indeed grow—
23ing, but not nearly as fast as projected. The firms project growth in minority
and female employment share far in excess of their own past history, and far
in excess of what they will actually fulfill.Is there then any information
at all in their projections, or is the entire procedure an exercise in futility?
The administrative records of completed compliance reviews include data on
past and projected employment demographics, indications of deficiencies found
in affirmative action plans, and an indicator for preaward compliance reviews
in which case one might expect the government's leverage to be greater. These
records also indicate successively higher levels of government pressure brought
to bear:hours expended by review officers, progress reports required, con-
ciliation process initiated, and, finally, show—cause notice issued.Each of
these mileposts in the bargaining process reflects both the establishment's
resistance to bureaucratic pressures and, at the same time, increasing levels
of bureaucratic pressure itself. If establishment resistance can be controlled
for, then these may be taken roughly as inputs into a regulatory production
function.By assuming that corporate resistance is controlled for by past
growth rates of protected group employment share, and by initial notification
of deficiencies, we can then ask what the marginal impact is on factors of
regulatory production such as conciliation agreements and show—cause notices.
These identifying assumptions are open to question. Caution should be exercised
in interpreting the following results since they may be biased toward finding
ineffective enforcement if enforcement has been targeted against the most
recalcitrant cases.
For all detailed regulation variables, the results are mixed and often in-
significant. One might expect greater growth in protected group employment in
the case of preaward compliance reviews——reviews mandated prior to the final
24award of large federal contracts——supposedly because the carrot is dangling so
close to the nose. On the other hand, few contracts have ultimately been lost
in this process, and the courts have been loath to uphold this type of leverage.
Twenty—nine percent of all the reviews studied Leonard (1985b) are preaward
reviews, but only in the case of black females did they make a significant
positive addition to protected—group employment share beyond that expected from
a regular review.
One—third of the establishments were required to make interimprogress re-
ports. This marginally greater pressure had no significant impact on their
subsequent demographics. One hundred twenty—two establishments, 3 percent of
the total, signed conciliation agreements to remedy deficiencies in their AAPs.
Perhaps their AAPs looked better, but their immediately subsequent demographics
did not.
The ultimate enforcement tool at the Department of Labor's disposal is
debarment, but none of the few actual uses of this deterrent shows up in our
sample. The strongest pressure observed is a show—cause notice; 24 establish-
ments received such notices offering them the opportunity to show cause why they
should not be debarred.On average, they had not significantly altered their
demographics a year later. On the whole, there is no compelling evidence here
that these detailed components of the enforcement process have a significant
impact on the employment of members of protected groups.
The major finding in Leonard (1985b) is that goals set in these costly ne-
gotiations do have a measurable and significant correlation with improvements
in the employment of minorities and females at reviewed establishments. At the
same time, these goals are not being fulfilled with the rigidity one would ex—
25pect of quotas. While the projections of future employment of members of pro-
tected groups are inflated, the establishments that promise to employ more do
actually employ more. The striking finding is that the affirmative action goal
is the single best predictor of subsequent employment demographics. It is far
better than the establishment's own past history, even controlling for the di-
rect impact of detailed regulatory pressure.
This indicates that while establishments promise more than they deliver, the
ones that promise more do deliver more, even conditioning on the past growth
rate of employment share.There is significant information in the projection
over and above what could have been predicted on the basis of past history.
On the other hand, the projection falls far short of perfect information. For
example, on average a projected 11 percentage point increase in the growth rate
of black male employment share results in an actual increase of one percentage
point, ceteris paribus.
Not only do establishments generally overpromise minority and female em-
ployment, they also overpromise white male employment. This reveals something
of their strategy in formulating promises. They do not promise direct substi-
tution of minority and female workers for white males; instead they promise more
for all. More accurately, they promise to make room for more minority and fe-
male employees by increasing the size of the total employment pie.The first
step in bringing these projections down to earth may simply be to ask the es-
tablishment whether the projected growth in total employment is reasonable.
We have a policy that appears to be effective in its whole and ineffective
in its parts. The paperwork requirements of the AAP, the notification and re-
solution of AAP deficiencies, and even conciliation agreements and show—cause
26notices appear to have no general significant impact on subsequent employment
demographics. On the other hand, protected—group employment share does gener-
ally grow more rapidly at reviewed firms, and goals are strongly correlated with
this growth. Do our results then indicate only the establishments' projections
reflect variations in supply known to them rather than induced variations in
demand? Alternatively, can we infer that extracting greater promises will re-
sult in greater achievement? The critical evidence is that there is an overall
response to pressure. Within labor markets of the same industry and region,
reviewed contractors do better than the nonreviewed, as other work shows. As
we have reveiwed here, within a given SMSA the establishments that set higher
goals achieve greater growth rates of protected—group employment. My reading
of this evidence is that while much of the nit—picking over paperwork is inef-
fective, the system of affirmative action goals has played a significant role
in improving employment opportunities for members of protected groups.
The Targeting of Compliance Reviews
Affirmative action can be broadly conceived of as pursuing either antidis—
crimination or job and earnings redistribution goals. That is to say, it can
either pursue equality or opportunity or equality of result.Given the his-
torical record, progress toward one goal will often entail progress toward the
other.In particular, discrimination seems to be a broad enough target that
it can be hit even with inperfect aim.The central question in this section,
drawn from Leonard (1985a), seeks to answer is: what are the actual goals of
affirmative action? The approach taken here is to infer the ends of affirmative
action policy from an analysis of the historical record of actual enforcement.
27Assertions concerning the ends of affirmative action are surprisingly com-
mon, especially when one realizes that only once in the past has the actual
pattern of enforcement been analyzed. This pathbreaking study of Heckman and
Wolpin (1976) examined the incidence of compliance reviews at a sample of 1185
Chicago area establishments during 1972.These compliance reviews are the
first, the most common, and usually the last step in the enforcement process.
Heckman and Wolpin find that the probability of review is not affected by es-
tablishment size, minority employment, or change in minority employment. They
discover "no evidence of a systematic government policy for reviewing contractor
firms".In other words, they find an essentially random enforcement process.
This first analysis of targeting studied a relatively small sample in one city
during the early 1970s, before the contract compliance program reached full
stride. Do these early findings hold true for the nation as a whole after af-
firmative action regulations and procedures matured? Just as importantly, how
are such results to be interpreted?
Which establishments does the OFCCP actually choose to review? Can we judge
its motives from its targeting policy, and do the goals so revealed conform to
those mandated in the Executive Order? The OFCCP has had, on paper, formal
targeting systems such as the Revised McKersie System or the later EISEN system.
These systems generally target in a sensible fashion against discrimination by
selecting for review those establishments with a low proportion of minorities
or females relative to other establishments in the same area and industry. But
interviews with OFCCP officials in Washington and in the field suggest that
these formal targeting systems were never really used.Instead of targeting
on the basis of an establishment's past demographic record, compliance officers
claim they simply reviewed the firms with the most employees, and the growing
firms. This section shows which types of establishments were actually reviewed
28between 1974 and 1980, primarily by the Department of Defense. Assuch, the
patterns shown here may not be indicative of current policies or practices of
the OFCCP, nor of past practices of ther compliance agencies. Inaddition, part
of the patterns observed here may reflect the requirements forpre—award com-
pliance reviews.
The model of affirmative action as an earnings redistributionprogram has
two testable implications. One can at best offer weaksupport for the hypoth-
esis, while the second can provide somewhat stronger support. The first is that
no particular pressure should be applied to firms with relatively few minorities
or females. This is what we observe in Tables 4 and 5, reproduced from Leonard
(1985a). While this strongly rejects the model of affirmative actionas anti-
discrimination in employment, it offers weak support for the alternativehy-
pothesis of affirmative action as earnings redistribution because it is also
compatible with other models of regulatory behavior.The second implication
of the earnings redistribution model is that greaterpressure should be brought
to bear to shift demand curves where the supply of labor is relatively inelas-
tic.In particular, this implies a higher incidence of compliance reviewsat
establishments with non—clerical white—collar intensive workforces.I find
significant evidence that this is what the OFCCP has done.
If one thought of the OFCCP's primary concern as fighting the most blatant
forms of prima facie employment discrimination directly in theworkplace, one
might then expect reviews to be concentrated at establishments with a relative
small proportion of females and black males, controlling for size, industry and
region.There is little consistent significant evidence of this in thepast.
In part, this may be explained by the requirement of pre—awardcompliance re-
views.Establishments with the smallest proportion of minorities or females,
29ceteris paribus, are not consistently more likely to be reviewed for compliance
with Executive Order 11246.Reviews are significantly more likely to take
place, ceteris paribus, in non—clerical white—collar intensive establishments.
Reviews are also more likely to occur at both large and growing establishments,
where any costs of white males are likely to be more diffused.
How can the lack of a consistent targeting pattern by race or sex be ex-
plained? The larger establishments often employ a greater proportion of mi-
norities and females.In interviews, field officers of the OFCCP have stated
that they do not generally look at an establishment's past demographic record
in targeting reviews. Reviewing large non—clerical white—collar intensive es-
tablishments with little regard for their past record of minority or female
employment is consistent with an affirmative action effort that in terms of
compliance review targeting is primarily concerned not with attacking the
grossest prima facie forms of current employment discrimination, but rather with
redistributing jobs and earnings to minorities and women.
The Impact of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
While the central focus of this analysis has been on affirmative action under
the Executive Order, it should be understood that the Executive Order has
functioned within the backdrop of Title Vii's Congressional madate and sub-
stantial legal sanctions. The dominant policy has been established under Title
VII. What impact then has Title VII had? Without attempting to review this
question as thoroughly as I have affirmative action, I can sketch some results.
For a more complete discussion, see Brown (1984), Freeman (1981), Butler and
Heckman (1977), and Smith (1978).
30The broadest perspective may be gained by considering what changes have oc-
curred in the earnings, income, occupational positions, and employment of blacks
relative to whites before and after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In reviewing this evidence, Richard B. Freeman (1982, p. 3) finds that 'virtu—
ally every indicator of positions shows a marked improvement in the economic
status of employed black workers with ——ashas been widely noted by various
analysts ——gainsconcentrated among women, highly educated or skilled men, and
young men.Virtually every indicator of positions also shows a marked accel-
eration in the economic status of employed black workers after 1964, when the
U.S. antibias effort intensified as a result of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of that year.." (emphasis added) While a substantial part of this improve-
ment can be attributed to the improved education of blacks [see Smith (1978)];
Title VII appears to have also contributed substantially and directly to im-
proving the economic position of employed blacks at a given level of education.
While employed blacks appear to have approached parity with whites more
rapidly since 1964, proportionately fewer blacks pass the initial hurdle of
becoming employed. As Freeman (1982, p. 10) notes "At the same time that there
has been a marked movement toward equality of earnings between employed blacks
and whites, however, there has been a distressing deterioration in the likeli-
hood of blacks holding jobs, particularly among the young.In 1964 the black
male civilian employment/population ratio stood at .73, in 1969 it was .73, and
in 1979 it was .64. By contrast, for white males, the ratio went from .78 (1964)
to .78 (1969) to .75 (1979). Equally striking, the youth joblessness problem
of the decade was one of increasing relative worsening in the black youth po-
sitions, for reasons that no one has yet satisfactorily explained. The aggre-
gate data thus tell two stories: improvement for the employed but a reduction
in the overall employment rate, especially in the 1970s".
31More recently, attempts have been made by Beller (1979) and Leonard (1984c)
to measure the impact of Title VII more directly using cross—sectional data.
Belier (1979) examines the impact of EEOC sex—discrimination enforcement (com-
plaint investigations and the ratio of successful to attempted settlements) on
female and male earnings from 1967 to 1974. She finds some evidence that EEOC
efforts have reduced the gender wage gap.
Class action suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are likely
to have been among the most powerful prods to increasing minority and female
employment, as Leonard (1984c) argues. Others have argued that the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflected a diminished level of discrimination on
the part of the electorate that one would expect to see reflected in improved
employment opportunities for minorities and women even if the act were never
enforced. Moreover, this line of argument proceeds, only a small proportion
of establishments have been directly involved in Title VII litigation, so large
effects are unlikely.This rosy view ignores the near defeat of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the continuing stream of litigation since, some of which
has established broad precedents.Moreover, the Kennedy Administration be-
lieved the 1964 act was too strong to pass. Title VII, and in particular the
clause extending protection to females, was supported by some congressmen be-
cause they believed it would doom the entire bill.It was precisely the pro-
visions for enforcement through the courts that distinguished Title VII from
its toothless, but equally noble, forebears and gave it prospects for effected
change.
Before 1972, the Justice Department was empowered to bring suit through the
courts for enforcement of Title VII's provisions. The EEOC's powers were lim-
ited to conciliation and persuasion.Since 1972 the power of litigation has
32been entrusted to the EEOC which, in turn, can pass it on to individual
plaintiffs. By such recourse to the courts, the EEOC can sometimes accomplish
in years what takes the OFCCP weeks. What it gives up in speed, though, it
sometimes wins back in power through the setting of sweeping legal precedents.
For example, the celebrated case of Griggs v. Duke Power did not simply aid
Griggs or affect only Duke Power.By establishing the principle of disparate
impact as prima facie evidence of discrimination, it placed a heavier burden
on all employers to avoid the appearance of discrimination.
The major contribution of the EEOC, which oversees Title VII enforcement,
has probably been in helping to establish far—reaching principles of Title VII
law in the courts which can then be used by private litigants, rather than in
directly providing relief from systematic discrimination through its own
enforcement activity. A 1976 General Accounting Office review of direct EEOC
enforcement activity concluded that it was generally ineffective. Most indi-
vidual charges were closed administratively before a formal investigation.
Charges took about two years to be resolved, and only 11 percent resulted in
successful negotiated settlements. There was little EEOC followup to ensure
compliance with conciliation agreements, and entering into a conciliation
agreement caused no significant change in a firm's employment of blacks or fe-
males. Between 1973 and 1975, among 12,800 charges for which the EEOC found
evidence of discrimination and was able to negotiate settlements, fewer than 1
percent had been brought to litigation resulting in favorable court decisions
(U.S. GAO, 1975). Between fiscal years 1972 and 1976 the EEOC brought 462 cases
to court (U.S. GAO, 1981).The much publicized charges brought by the EEOC
against AT&T, GM, Ford, Sears, GE, and the International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers in the early seventies were largely anomalous. This major legal
and public relations offensive was atypical of the Commission, which has
33normally been a reactive body slowly working its way through a mountain of in-
dividual complaints, many of which it discards as lacking substance. [See Hill
(1983) for a critique.]
Despite its official mandate, the EEOC claims not to place great weight on
such individual complaints in targeting enforcement, considering them unreli-
able. Rather, in interviews it claims to target by using EEO—1 forms to screen
out establishments whose entry—level employment of protected groups compares
poorly with that prevalent in the SMSA and whose professional employment falls
short of the national norm. But according to the 1976 General Accounting Office
report, "...theuse of such (EEO—1) information in sophisticated methodologies
for selecting targets for systematic enforcement activities has been minimal'.
The EEOC also claims to take into account community reputation, past charges,
and the size of the company. It avoids large companies, finding them too hard
to digest.Yet this targeting system has produced relatively few systemic
charges.There is little evidence to suggest that the EEOC has focused its
attention on large firms that systematically discriminate.I argue, however,
that litigation under Title VII by private parties and by the EEOC constituted
the cutting edge of government antidiscrimination policy.
Between 1964 and 1981 more than 5000 cases of litigation under Title VII,
many of which were private suits, were decided in the federal district courts.
More than 1700 of these were class action suits. These are the tip of an iceberg
consisting of cases settled out of court or decided in state courts, but these
class action decisions are likely to generate the most publicity, result in the
largest awards, and affect the most people. What has been the impact of this
Title VII litigation?
34The enforcement of Title VII through the courts has contributed to a sig—
nificant improvement of the employment and occupational status of blacks.In
regressions of the change in the percentage of workers in an occupation who are
members of a protected group on number of Title VII class action suits per
corporation, percentage of employment in an industry by state cell that is in
federal contractor establishments under the affirmative action obligation, and
a lagged dependent variable, Title VII leads to sometimes negative but generally
insignificant changes for white females, but to a moderate and significant im-
provement in the employment of blacks. The demand shifts for females may simply
be swamped by the ongoing massive increase in labor supply.In addition, many
of the early Title VII cases focused on racial rather than gender discrimi-
nation. The apparent ineffectiveness of antidiscrimination policy in promoting
female employment remains an interesting question for research. Table 6 [re-
produced from Leonard (1984c)] summarizes the impact of Title VII litigation.
In this table Title VII litigation plays a significant role in increasing
blacks' employment share.
For example, between 1966 and 1978 the proportion of all workers in manu-
facturing who were black increased from .08 to .12.On average, a Title VII
class action suit per corporation raises this proportion to .277. Since there
was an average of .011 such suits per corporation in a state by industry cell,
about 7 percent of the improvement in black employment share can be attributed
directly to Title VII litigation. The impact is even more pronounced for black
females. This counts only the direct effects of litigation on firms in the same
industry and state. In particular, it does not count the spillover effects onto
firms in other industries and states from establishing credible threats and
wide—ranging legal precedents.In fact, the greater the spillover, the less
the differential impact of Title VII estimated here.
35The proportionate impact of Title VII litigation is summarized in Table 6.
This litigation has had its strongest impact in the white—collar occupations.
Black gains through Title VII have been most striking in professional and man-
agement positions, suggesting that Title VII litigation has created pressure
for occupational advancement as well as employment. The analysis here treats
litigation under Title VII as exogenous. If one believes that Title VII suits
that reach a decision in the federal district courts are more prevalent in firms
with growing black employment, then the estimate presented here will be biased
upward.More plausibly, in my judgement, if discrimination leads to both
stagnant levels of black employment and to litigation, then my estimate of the
impact of Title VII will be biased downward and the positive results shown here
are that much more notable.
In sum, these results suggest that Title VII litigation has played a sig-
nificant role over and above that of affirmative action. This impact has been
greated for blacks than for women, and greater for the skilled than for the
unskilled.
Antidiscriminationor Reverse Discrimination?
We have seen that despite poor targeting, affirmative action has helped
promotethe employment of minorities and women, and that Title VII has likely
played an even greater role. This raises the most important and the most con-
troversial question:has this reduced discrimination, or has it gone behond
and induced reverse discrimination against white males?This is also the
question on which our evidence is least conclusive. The finding of decreased
36evidence in this study is that affirmative action and Title VII have been suc—
cessful in promoting the integration of blacks into the American workplace.
Hopefully, evidence of the effectiveness of past affirmative action programs
will be of some use as we prepare to enter the second generation of policy by
troubled euphemism: non—preferential affirmative action.
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available evidence is not yet strong enough to be compelling on either side of
this issue. Since the productivity estimates are not measured with great pre-
cision, strong policy conclusions based on this particular result should be
resisted.
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LineGroupStatus Mean c Mean Mean2 Mcan%
1 Black N .053 .10 .059 .10 .006 28
2Males Y .058 .10 .067 .10 .008 33
3 (6.0) (9.4) (6.5) (3.6)
4Other N .034 .10 .046 .10 .012 52
5 MinorityY .035 .08 .048 .09 .013 58
6 Males (1.6) (2.1) (1.2) (2.1)
7White N .448 .27 .413 .26—.034 —2
S Males Y .584 .26 .533 .25—.047 —4
9 (66.7) (66.5) (16.4) (2.0)
ICBlack N .047 .10 .059 .11 .0124'
11 Females Y .030 .07 .045 .08 .015 77
12 (24.0) (19.2) (5.7) (10.8)
13Other N .024 .08 .036 .08 .012 65
14 MinorityY .016 .05 .028 .06 .012 77
15 Females (14.8) (13.0) (II) (3.2)
16White N .394 .27 .400 .26 006 17
17Females Y .276 .23 .288 .23 .012 30
18 (59.7) (57.8) (7.8) (11.9)
19Total N 186 286 209 341 23 17
20 Y 271 728 276 720 5 21
21 (21.2) (16.2) (10.7) (3.3)
Nors.—T-testsacross means in parentheses, ott everythirdline In evnrs casc, f-i(sts ret
of variances across contractors and noncontractors, 1th more than 99v conhdcnce The last c1 is tht
mean of percentage changes, not the percentage of change in means, isnoncontractor in 974 (2',432





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MEkNSOF PROJECTED AND ACTUAL EMPLOYMENT LEVELS
BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUP (N5240)
Mode Year
1974 1975 1976 1976
Lagged 2YearsLagged 1YearProjectionActualization
Black male 54 55 61 54
Minonty nonblack 38 40 42 40
male
White male 628 623 615 602
Total male 720 718 718 696
Black female 34 35 39 35
Mlnoril\ nonblack 20 2) 23 22
fern Ic
White female 218 216 222 2)0
Total female 272 272 284 267
Total 992 990 1001 963
No'c. Thefirst column is theactual lcvcl of employment one year bcfore the
projectionwas made. Tue second column is the actual level of employment in
the year the projection was foi-med. The third column is the projection. For
the mode observation, this rs a one-year-ahead projection made in 1975 for the
lcvcl of employment expected to occur in 1976. The fourth column is tht levcl
of employment aclually realized in the following year.
Reproducedfrom Leonard 1985bTable 4
l'roporton of1)cIcricCont r.lctor Ist .ih Iclinic,itcRcvic Cd
from 1975 to 1q79,liv I '74BLic kIc LmpIomcn tShare
7,9(5I.i.ntThhnncnt)
I nc
1l.nk c1,nIc I np1
Sh,ir,P)74 \' PrprTn.I 1... cn
1 .00 i:7 .1:i
2 01-02 Ij2 .00'
i .02— 04 1.210 2'
4 .04— 0' 711 .254
S .05—05 4)3
1 .05-. IC 350 ' .10-20 911 30!
S .20—SO 633
9 .5C-..'O 72 .c3
0 .70—1.00 6 .155




of 1)clcncc Coot rictor I .ctiihlisliniciitc Rcvci ed form I
1q74Fciimilc l.nmployrmtcntSharc ('s=7,965 1 t.ihIIhm'nt)
[inc Icrn,ik' InpIo rent SI V Pt p'rtin Rec cnJ
.00 74 .000
2 .00—05 .073 .151
3 .05-. 2,0'2 .21
4 .15-25 l,C)
5 25- 30 3)7 .052
(, .30.35 404
7 .35—40 404
8 .40-50 707 .270
9 .5O—.0 9c0 .232
0 .701.00 7h) .250
Reproduced from Leonard 1985aT
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